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Hugh Lacey

Listening to the Evidence*
... the least that human courtesy can do is
to listen to the evidence.
(W. E. B. duBois, 1903)
Is there a place for community-based learning in the curriculum of the lib
eral arts college? Can service activities in the community be integrated
into research projects and courses of study in ways that enhance or that
even may be required for the gaining of understanding? (Similar questions
can be asked about political organizing and other activities in the commu
nity. Here I focus on service.) If so, concerning what phenomena and un
der what conditions; and can that place be established in such a way that
service does not become treated simply as a means to gaining understand
ing (and fulfilling other objectives of the college), and that understanding
does not become subordinated either to service itself or to those moral vir
tues that supposedly may be cultivated by engaging in service?
I will address these questions in a limited way with a focus on urban
poverty in the contemporary U.S.A. In doing so I assume that one of the
core tasks of the liberal arts college is to gain and to disseminate under
standing of significant social phenomena, those phenomena from which no
lives are isolated and response to which largely defines the moral charac
ter of the times. This means to participate, and to prepare students to par
ticipate, in the cultural and value debates that serve to define the sort of
society in which we aspire to live. In our times urban poverty and its at
tendant phenomena, and the way in which their forms are being reshaped
by programs of “welfare reform,” are among the key morally significant
social phenomena.

This article represents views and arguments developed in discussions with col
leagues working in the Chester-Swarthmore College Community Coalition during
the mid-1990s, especially Thompson Bradley, Maurice Eldridge, and members of
the public housing community in Chester. It is a considerably rewritten version of
H. Lacey, “Listening to the Evidence; Service Activity and Understanding Social
Phenomena,” in Beyond the Tower: Concepts and Models for Service Learning in
Philosophy, ed. C. D. Lisman and I. Harvey (Washington, DC; American Associa
tion for Higher Education, 2000), 53-68, and it is used here with the permission of
the organizing editor of this volume.
Sibelan Forrester and Thomas Newlin, eds. Towards a Classless Society: Studies in
Literature, History, and Politics in Honor of Thompson Bradley, Bloomington, IN;
Slavica, 2004, 213-26.
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Welfare reform has been driven by a mode of understanding urban
poverty, apparently widely shared across the mainstream political spec
trum, which may be summarized as follows. In the first place, the current
condition of the poor represents a state of dependency on government that
has reinforced numerous vices that entrap the poor in a “culture of pov
erty”: laziness, avoidance of work, violence, criminality and other forms of
social destructiveness, irresponsible sexual, child-bearing, and child
raising habits, drug use, absence of personal initiative and lack of prepar
edness to make use of opportunities, being manipulative in blaming their
condition on racism and playing on feelings of guilt among the well-off.
Secondly, on balance, recent government programs on behalf of the poor
represent a net harm—in some versions, because they could not be effica
cious since the causes of poverty are not social or structural, but rather
located in alleged individual attributes such as low intelligence and genet
ically based proneness to violence. Thirdly, government spending for pro
grams targeted to alleviate poverty represents a burden or even an injust
ice towards the middle class taxpayer. Thence, fourthly, possibilities for
empowerment of the poor require policies, legislation and programs that
will impel them towards “self sufficiency” and “taking responsibility for
their own lives.”
Diagnoses and prescriptions like these have dominated the public and
legislative debate on welfare reform. How sound are they? It seems obvi
ous that support for them, if they are proposed responsibly, should be
empirically well grounded, that it would derive from experiential contact
with the phenomenon. Oddly enough, this truism tends to be ignored. Al
though the proponents of welfare reform tend to display remarkable cer
titude when talking about poor people and the appropriate means to bring
about reform, few of them have had close contact with any poor people or
any sort of on-going dialogue with them. Their evidence draws from in
quiries on the poor conducted at a distance, through the mediation of sta
tistical reports and a battery of anecdotes, without communication with
the reflective experiences and tested agency of the poor themselves.
In 1903 W. E. B. du Bois wrote: “We must not forget that most Ameri
cans answer all queries regarding the Negro a priori, and that the least
that human courtesy can do is to listen to the evidence.”^ The point
applies as much to the poor as to “the Negro,” who are often one and the
same person. Things have not changed much in a century; the voices of
the poor themselves are largely absent from the public debate. Little effort
has been made to find out how poor people characterize themselves, how
they diagnose the causes of their condition, how they express their hopes,
and how they identify and articulate the possibilities that they consider
^ W. E. B. du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks (New York: New American Library,
1982), 130.
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worthy of their aspiration. “The evidence” is not being much listened to.
The poor tend not to be seen as parties to developing the “solution” to the
“problem” that they, their behavior, their traits and their communities are
perceived to constitute.
Moreover, the certitude of those who offer these diagnoses and pre
scriptions is reflected in the kind of language they use: often harsh, puni
tive, scornful, humiliating, coercive, “tough” and disengaged, dominated
by appeal to a “realism” that does not recognize any viable possibilities
outside of the framework of its core certainties and that is more respon
sive to the realities of power than to the fruits of careful, systematic, em
pirical inquiry. This “realism” is framed at the moment by more encom
passing certitudes (additional “a priori’s”) such as the value of the free
market, private control of capital, downscaled government and enhanced
realms of private initiatives, and the “naturalness” of prioritizing self in
terest.^ This is not a language in which dialogue could be conducted with
poor people. Absent is any sense of mercy, love (except “tough love”), com
passion, solidarity, brother and sisterhood, sacrifice for the sake of the
common good, and any sense that our lives are all intertwined. No doubt
they are absent because they do not figure in the equations and calcula
tions of “realism.” Could it be that there is a connection between the certi
tude of diagnosis and the harshness of language, so that the “a priori” is
grounded in the preparedness to use power (and the institutions of vio
lence, e.g., prisons) to ensure compliance with the tenets of “realism?” Or
perhaps it is grounded in the widespread tendency to replace the full ex
ploration of the causal nexus of poverty with the premature (and morally
righteous) assignment of responsibilities for the failure to eliminate its
pathologies.
Understanding
The remarks above merely express some impressions and polemical com
ments on the welfare reform debate. They provide a context for raising the
questions: What is it to gain understanding of a social phenomenon like
urban poverty in the U.S. today? How is that understanding gained and
how should it be gained? What should be the criteria for appraising it?
How is “listening to the evidence” related to these criteria? What might we
find out if we did listen, and how must we be placed and what must we do
in order to listen? With what idiom must we transcribe the evidence and
how can we learn it? What possibilities (if any) unrecognized in main
stream discourse, and what varieties of them, are there in the commu
nities of poor people to be identified and nurtured?
^ See H. Lacey, “Neutrality in the Social Sciences,” Journal for the Theory of Social
Behavior 27 (1997): 213-41.
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Understanding of a significant social phenomenon has three interact
ing components: those that describe, explain and encapsulate the possibil
ities allowed by it.® It involves, in the first place, a comprehensive descrip
tive charting of the phenomenon, and of the agents whose lives are part of
it, including accounts of its variations, differences, conflicts and current
tendencies. Adequate charting is sensitive not only to all of the dimen
sions, concreteness, historicity and particularity of the phenomenon as
well as to relevant statistical data, not only to the sufferings and patholo
gies that have brought it to mainstream attention as a “problem,” but also
to the unrealized anticipations of and proposals for furthering hope and
transformation present within it.
Understanding involves, secondly, historical-sociological-psychological
analyses of how the phenomenon has been shaped and maintained, in
cluding analyses of the social and material conditions, mechanisms and
regularities of the various modes of life that the structures which frame
the phenomena allow (and require), and of the interactions and structural
relations among these modes of life. This provides the background for as
sessing and appraising the relative importance of the various factors
(natural, individual, behavioral, cultural, institutional, structural—and
their interactions with one another) that have made causal contributions
to the phenomenon, recognizing that explanatory adequacy requires that
attention be given to all the detail charted descriptively.
Thirdly, gaining understanding involves attempts to diagnose what
the range of future possibilities may be, including those for fundamental
transformation, given the conditions and constraints provided by the pre
sent phenomena and the structures that frame them; and to identify what
practices, what alliances with other people and institutions, and what
transforming of institutions and structures would be necessary to bring
some of these possibilities to realization (and what are the impediments to
this happening). Crucial here is the recognition that on the one hand the
currently predominant structures, their regularities and tendencies signi
ficantly constrain the range of future possibilities; but on the other hand
that there are genuine possibilities, realized in anticipatory forms in the
marginal spaces of these structures, which may be able to gain the con
ditions to develop.
Certain kinds of service activities (to be specified below) can play
useful roles in the processes of gaining understanding of phenomena such
as urban poverty. My argument (which is far from exhaustive) will focus
on the question of the possibilities encapsulated in the phenomenon of ur® H. Lacey, “Notes on the Dialectic of Truth and Justice,” in B. Schwartz, ed.
Educating for Social Responsibility in a Multicultural World, The Swarthmore
Papers 1 (1993), 107-16; idem. Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific
Understanding (London: Routledge, 1999), chap. 5.
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ban poverty. I emphasize that understanding cannot be reduced to
description and explanation; it also involves encapsulation of future possi
bilities which, in turn, cannot be reduced to prediction which (in the social
sciences) can only be successful under stable structural conditions."* It is
important to pursue the question of future possibilities in a disciplined
and empirical way that avoids simultaneously the pitfalls of ideology (ac
cepting the inevitability of the tendencies of the status quo as defined by
actual relations of power) and illusion (fueled by a value-driven volunta
rism, deriving possibilities from what one deems desirable). While sound
understanding is opposed to both ideology and illusion, it is not unin
formed by values.® From values one cannot derive what is genuinely pos
sible, but values can attune us to realms of possibilities that are worthy of
investigation. Moreover, in human affairs certain possibilities can be rea
lized only if there are people who hold certain values, who desire that
those possibilities be realized, and who are motivated to act to bring them
to realization.®
Any human phenomenon can afford myriad possibilities, since it
involves (among other things) the actions of intentional agents and rela
tions among them, and it is open to transformation in the light of re
shaping the relations and interactions among any number and variety of
individuals and social institutions. (Service activities of members of the
liberal arts college, for example, become part of the phenomenon of urban
poverty.) Not all genuine possibilities can be realized, for the conditions
required for the realization of some may preclude those of others. Further
more, since the investigation of social possibilities itself requires material
resources and social conditions, not all genuine social possibilities and the
means towards their possible realization can be investigated. We cannot
expect to be able to develop theories in which all genuine possibilities will
be encapsulated. In order to investigate future possibilities, a selection of
the kinds of possibilities of interest must be made, a selection which will
reflect a value commitment, even if the selection made is just to inves
tigate the trajectory of actual structures and predominant tendencies.’
When we turn to a phenomenon like contemporary urban poverty, how
ever, understanding is seriously incomplete (incommensurate with urban
poverty being one of the phenomena to which response largely defines the
moral character of our times) if it does not identify possibilities (if there
"* Lacey, “Neutrality in the Social Sciences.”
® Lacey, Is Science Value Free?
® H. Lacey and B. Schwartz, “The Formation and Transformation of Values,” in
The Philosophy of Psychology, ed. W. O’Donohue and R. F. Kitchener (London:
Sage, 1996), 321-40.
’ Lacey, “Neutrality in the Social Sciences”; idem. Is Science Value Free? chaps. 810.
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are any) for the lessening of the suffering (in all of its dimensions) experi
enced by the poor and for the transformation of their condition so that
possibilities for human flourishing become more realizable for them, and if
it does not identify the social processes and the institutions that might
serve to bring these possibilities to realization; or if it does not explain
(with explanations that have been well tested empirically) why no possi
bilities for transformation are available.
Thus, if we want to understand poverty, we need to address: Do the
tendencies and regularities of current structures open up (or prevent)
possibilities of expanded well being for those who are poor and suffering
(without diminishing those of others)? Would alternative social arrange
ments, aspired to in movements for social change in poor communities and
present in anticipatory forms among them, offer greater possibilities for
enhanced well being? Could modifications of current structures, and trans
formations of its institutions, provide space that would enable the legiti
mate aspirations of the poor to come to realization?
Evidence
How can questions like these be investigated in a systematic and
empirically-grounded way—without presupposing a priori that reigning
structures and only they can incorporate all future possibilities worth
aspiring to,® or without making presuppositions tailored to fit our hopes
and desires, while still recognizing both that future possibilities are con
strained (not determined) by prevailing structures, powers and concep
tions of well being (as well as by psychological, natural and ecological fac
tors), and that what the future will become depends largely on the agency
and choices of human beings interacting together? Answering this ques
tion in a comprehensive way is beyond the scope of this article. 1 focus on
an important detail. What should count as evidence when addressing
questions like those raised in the previous paragraph?
Relevant evidence obviously includes reports of the sufferings and the
pathologies of the poor communities as presented in the usual demo
graphic and statistical analyses, and data relevant to getting at the micro
mechanisms underlying them. Not so often recognized, it also includes de
tailed accounts of the phenomenon as it is experienced by members of the
communities themselves (since we wish to investigate alternative possibil
ities that may be germinating in the communities), of the concrete daily
experience of members of the community, their histories, struggles and
achievements, opportunities, values, knowledge, visions and images of
hope, motivations, practical ideas, leaders, alliances and affiliations, bud
ding initiatives, frustrated previous efforts, programs for transformation;
® Lacey, “Neutrality in the Social Sciences.’
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and of interpretations of their condition, of ongoing events, of whom (per
sons and institutions) they trust and distrust, and why. The latter kind of
evidence cannot be gained without contact—extended, multi-faceted, and
involving considerable listening and dialogue—with those who experience
the phenomena of poverty.
Service
How can the appropriate contact be obtained? One way is through care
fully designed projects of service, and often that is the only way practically
open to students and other personnel at liberal arts colleges. Other ways
would include living or working in a poor community, organizing polit
ically in it, or participating in its religious life. Obviously the poor them
selves have the contact simply by virtue of being members of the com
munities. That is why reflective testimony of the experience of the poor
made by poor people themselves has an authority that is not readily
discounted; nor, of course, is it the last word on an issue. Service, as such,
is not sufficient, for it may be performed while making very little contact
with the experience and context of the lives of the poor, and with little un
derstanding of the conditions that must be in place for service to be effec
tive. Under certain conditions it may even hinder gaining understanding
of the possibilities of transformation.
To be able to provide the appropriate contact, service activities norm
ally should be part of a well planned set of programs, where the activities
and programs embody the following four interacting levels (first stated in
Lacey, Bradley, and Eldridge, “The Chester-Swarthmore College Commu
nity Coalition”):
• Each of the programs and activities has value by itself by virtue of
its attempting to address a need identified by community members
in an urban poor neighborhood—bringing resources, skills, training,
and above all knowledge and the capability to generate knowledge
into the community.
• They are integrated in a process of comprehensive community-wide
(and, where possible, broader social) change—building institutions
that all participants will share—directed towards goals established
in collaboration with the community members.
• They are carried out at sites where students and others can per
form community service that has been approved by the community
and that is subject to ongoing supervision and evaluation; and
where efforts are made to foster discussion and interaction between
community members and those engaged in the service activities, to
nurture respect and friendships, and to explore together further
forms of collaboration.
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• They are conducted with a spirit of reciprocity, with all involved
conceiving what they are doing as part of a common task whose
goals are important for all of them. College personnel, community
residents, and representatives of other public, private and commu
nity organizations conceive themselves as working together for the
same goals while playing different roles. The college personnel are
not helpers or providers, but accompany and participate in the
process of social change for the long haul, aiming, among other
things, to create a new kind of institution of learning in which poor
people can participate integrally and from which they can gain
knowledge and research to inform their projects for social change.®
The four levels interact, and all are essential if the service activity is
to provide the kind of contact that locates one adequately for gaining evi
dence of the kind described above, while not treating service to the poor
simply as a means to ends held by various college personnel. Service alters
the phenomenon. Ideally it becomes part of the means to bringing about
social change of the kind desired by the community members, and at the
same time to bringing about transformations in the structures of learning
and research in the college. In the light of the four levels, projects are con
ceived and designed so as to re-shape the social relations between investi
gator and investigated, between college and community, so that the col
lege keeps its core tasks in the foreground, the community is served, and
interactions are conducted with the various parties to them being con
sidered and treated as agents, participants in a shared enterprise. Where
all the levels are in place, programs of service become (in part) tests of
certain types of possibilities of social transformation: e.g., the possibility of
shaping social institutions (the college, for instance) so as to exhibit the
widest possible inclusiveness, diversity of perspectives, visions and people,
where there is special attention to including those currently excluded or
neglected. Then, appraisal of their success and progress (or failure) is
itself a partial provider of relevant evidence about what future possibil
ities may be.
My point is a very simple one and, if one holds that claims to under
stand should be submitted to the tribunal of broadly empirical criteria, a
quite obvious one: understanding the phenomenon of poverty requires ex
periential contact with it, and projects of service—structured in the way
outlined—can provide the opportunity to have that contact. The contact, of
course, does not provide the understanding, but the occasion for gaining
the evidence to bring to bear in gaining understanding. Thus, projects of
® H. Lacey, T. Bradley, and M. Eldridge, “The Chester-Swarthmore College
Community Coalition: Linking Projects for Community Empowerment in a Public
Housing Development with a College’s Academic and Outreach Programs,”
Universities and Community Schools 4 (1994): 41-49.
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service of these kinds can play useful roles in connection with one of the
fundamental tasks of the liberal arts college, provided that they are
accompanied by careful and systematic reflection, by the further study,
analysis and research necessary for the formation and testing of the
understanding that has been generated, and by systematic and critical
interaction with other research and literature in the field. When our objec
tive is to gain understanding, working in the community is no substitute
for theoretical analysis and critique; it may be essential, however, to put
us into contact with indispensable evidence against which the prevailing
theories should be tested.
Integrating Service into a Course
While my point is simple, the conditions proposed above are not easy to
implement. So it is fair to ask whether the general argument can actually
give rise to concrete implementations. What actual difference in what is
understood is made by engaging in these service practices? I cannot an
swer this in a general or in a conclusive way. By way of a partial (even
oblique) answer let me offer some reflections on how an obligatory service
component affected discussions in a class I gave in the Philosophy of the
Social Sciences that was devoted to investigating methodologies of the
study of poverty.^® Most of the students were involved in weekly tutorial
activities in the community center of a public housing development in
Chester, PA (a small city located a few miles from Swarthmore); they had
opportunities to talk with adults from the community, and occasionally
some of them attended community meetings. The following is a list of
some of the ways in which directed reflection on and discussion of the
service activity enhanced the philosophical discussion of the class.
1. It provided a rich context for the discussion of observation, particu
larly of how observation may or not be a function of such factors as
what one is looking for, one’s personal history, one’s location, what
one is doing, how one is interacting with people, one’s expectations
and one’s cultural background. When students compared their own
observations of the community center and events happening in it
with those of their fellow students, with those of the community
members, and with those of public housing officials, they were
struck by differences (on occasion, even contradictions); and so the
issue of the objectivity (or not) of observation in the social sciences
became an immediate and concrete issue.
For the syllabus, bibliography, and other details of the course, see Lacey,
“Methodologies of the Study of Poverty,” in Service-Learning: Linking Academics
and the Community, ed. J. W. Eby (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Campus Compact,
1996), 139-47.
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2. What is the phenomenon of poverty that social science aims to un
derstand, and the public policy makers want to redress? Is poverty
(and its attendant phenomena, e.g., racism and abuse of women)
just a problem? Is it also a site for hope, struggle and novel possibil
ities? How does one’s characterization of poverty interact with one’s
social values and commitments about programs to transform the
condition of the poor? How is poverty experienced by the poor
themselves, how is their experience relevant to how one charac
terizes poverty, and what sort of language do they use to describe
it? Engaged contact with the phenomenon seemed to attune the
students to the ways in which social science studies (and the public
discussion about welfare reform) tend to presuppose (a priori) an
swers to such questions, and so raised sharply the questions about
evidence that are central to this article.
3. What is, and what ought to be, the relevance of local knowledge,
(including local history) to understanding the phenomenon of pov
erty, to public policy formation, and to the decision making proc
esses of public authorities? The students quickly became aware that
the residents know a great deal that they themselves do not know,
and would not come to know except through organized contact with
the residents: e.g., about (in our case) Chester and its history, about
the public housing development, about the hopes, visions and moti
vations of the residents as well as about their sufferings and frus
trations, and about their struggle (and sometimes organized efforts)
to create a better life, especially for their children. This experience,
in turn, raises critical questions about the “privilege” that tends to
be granted to knowledge gained in the social sciences. What (if any
thing) grounds the privilege of “scientifically generated” knowledge?
Does it properly displace local knowledge when we seek com
prehensive understanding and the grounding of the social values
that shape public policy? How, e.g., might local knowledge provide
relevant evidence for testing the assumptions about “dependency”
that inform the welfare reform debate?
4. Questions about certain social science methodologies can be raised
in novel ways. Concerning ethnographic studies, e.g., what are we
to say of the reliability of a study if its subjects disagree with it?
This question is sharpened when one can discuss with the subjects
the reasons for their disagreement. The general adequacy of quan
titative methods can be raised, too, especially when students hear
articulate residents characterize the community’s condition with
emphasis on concepts like “brokenness” rather than measures like
low income or unemployment rate. “Brokenness” is used by Ella
Thompson, a resident of and organizer in Chester public housing
who was, for many years, co-chair of the Chester-Swarthmore Col-
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lege Community Coalition, to characterize the core sufferings expe
rienced by and within the community: brokenness of personal lives,
brokenness of relations among residents, brokenness from the life
of the city and public affairs, which must be “healed” if the cycle of
despair and violence is to be overcome. And the students become
likely to move beyond the statistics about how many children finish
their schooling and begin to ask about the motivations and
motivation-formation processes of those who do and those who do
not.
5. The students recognized (some of) the residents as vital agents,
people with an interest in developing themselves and transforming
their community, whose leaders have their own ideas about how to
go about doing so—and a history of attempts, with some successes
and some failures, to implement their ideas. They also observed the
public housing authorities developing a plan to relocate residents
without holding discussions with them and without taking into con
sideration their forcefully articulated objections and alternative
proposals. In short, the authorities were ignoring the residents’
agency (knowledge, understanding, values, and aspirations), thus
acting on the basis of an understanding of who the residents are
that is not faithful to reality. The students also became aware that,
in the ongoing debate about welfare reform, welfare recipients have
in general not been invited to participate, thus perceiving it as a de
bate that presupposes that it is appropriate to make far-reaching
decisions about the lives of poor people without engaging them in
the process. This provided a context for asking how to investigate a
group while simultaneously recognizing the agency, proper to hu
man beings, of its members. Also, how can public policy be devel
oped in ways that respect the agency of poor people, rather than
treating them as objects for whose lives decisions are made in
accordance with what “experts” and “authorities” think is good for
them? What sort of social science do we pursue when we take these
questions seriously? This raises the potential salience of “partici
pant action” research, and the centrality of interpretive methods
that attempt to understand actions, habits, motives and predisposi
tions as springing from agents’ self-understandings.
6. What is the range of possibilities afforded by current realities? Are
these possibilities fully framed by what can be done within pre
vailing socioeconomic structures in accordance with current domi
nant tendencies? The students met residents who aspire to differ
ent, novel possibilities in which the community would exercise
control over itself and become an active agent in public affairs (as
was clear in their conflict with the housing authorities). The aspira
tions are often expressed in a language that involves interesting
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twists in the use of commonplace terms. Where “empowerment,”
typically implying strong individualist connotations, is often used to
express the objective of welfare reform, community residents speak
instead of aspiring to “community empowerment:”
... it aims for the sharing of responsibilities and for community
transformation, rather than encouraging individuals to ‘get out’,
just to cope, to live with lowered expectancies, to accept submis
sively the dependency that can accompany welfare [or the direc
tives of the welfare reform agents]; it aims to motivate commu
nity members to participate actively and authoritatively in the
process of community transformation so that they have a genu
ine choice: to construct a fulfilling life in their own community,
or to follow some other path. Community empowerment is thus
part of a process of social transformation that is grounded in
democratic means, and that at the same time enhances the ex
pression of democracy. It puts democracy ahead of efficiency, the
considered judgment of community leaders ahead of the general
izations and assessments of possibility of social analysts, and
community involvement ahead of programs designed and imple
mented by outside experts. It builds the conditions for genuine
democratic decision-making at the community level so that the
community members become active agents and decision-makers
in the process of change, and do not become reduced to recipients
of aid, the goals and programs of which are determined by out
side agencies. It holds that the authority for determining what is
good for the community lies—in the final analysis, after appro
priate dialogue with agencies that wish to offer services and
with due consideration given to the experiences of other commu
nities—with the community members themselves.
Are the residents’ alternatives genuine possibilities, or merely
idle, rhetorical gestures conjured up out of despair?
How (an instance of my central question) does one deploy
empirical evidence to answer this question? There is virtually no
philosophical literature that addresses this matter of evidence
concerning claims about future possibilities, yet I believe that it is
the most urgent epistemological issue facing us today. One of the
major achievements of the course was that the abstract question,
“Are there genuine alternative possibilities afforded by current
realities?” became converted into the concrete one, “Do the
Lacey, Bradley, and Eldridge, “'The Chester-Swarthmore College Community
Coalition,” 45; Ngina Lythcott contributed to this formulation.
See Lacey, “Neutrality in the Social Sciences.”
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residents’ alternative proposals represent genuine possibilities^
That question is open to a measure of empirical investigation: by
ongoing observation of the unfolding of their proposals (and of the
obstacles they face), of their being turned into a series of concrete
projects for addressing needs, of their gradually bringing abou
recognizable changes in the community that the residents recognize
as positive, and of their becoming linked institutionally with the
projects and structures of other groups and institutions (including
colleges) so that they begin to obtain the structural conditions for
permanent maintenance and growth. The last consideration here
also turns attention to the link between transformation of the
condition of the poor and the transformation of major societal
institutions, including colleges. One component of service activities
is that friendships may be established among community and
university personnel; such friendships can be the source ot
motivation for institutional change.
7. Contact with the phenomenon of poverty engenders a strong sense
both of the complexity of problems and of the tenuousness ot
opportunity, as well as a realization of the presence of resistance
and struggle. To understand the phenomenon, one must grasp the
full causal nexus—the macro and micro causal factors: the struc
tural, interpersonal, and behavioral, matters of public policy and
personal responsibility and initiative—and gaining such under
standing cannot properly ignore the input derived from the per
spective of poor people themselves. Transformation of the condition
of the poor requires both structural and personal transformation in
dialectical interaction. There are no “quick fixes”; there is no one
(principal) type of causal factor that has only to be changed tor
transformation to ensue. Awareness of such complexity tends to
move one away from using explanatory analysis as a means for
assigning blame or moral responsibility. Frequently the public de
bate is more about who is to blame for the pathologies of poverty,
and who is responsible for initiating and funding solutions, t^^njt
is about understanding the phenomenon as it is, and what could be
done to transform it. While I do not think that the social sciences
can be value-free,” I think it is a profound error to confuse
explanatory analysis with the assignment of blame, and to remove
from the causal account factors that one thinks ought not be
changed (e.g., private control of capital) because of considerations of
rights. (It is also an error to predict disastrous consequences simjdy
from what one judges to be morally ill-motivated policies. The
possibilities afforded by the moment are always more encompassing
” Lacey, “Neutrality in the Social Sciences.’
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than what can be grasped by “a priori” or “moralistic” analysis.)
Responsibility can be exercised in a variety of ways (depending on
who one is and where one is located); when we look to the full
causal nexus, it becomes possible to discern where one can make
constructive interventions in order to exercise one’s own
responsibility—and different people and institutions may be better
suited to make interventions in different places and ways.
Concluding Remarks
My conclusions are modest. In order to understand certain phenomena
(e.g., urban poverty) one must draw upon appropriate contact with the
phenomena, and service activities may provide the vehicle for this contact.
The difficult part is to design the service activities and their place within a
curricular structure so that they do in fact contribute to the gaining of un
derstanding. No general epistemological argument about service as a pos
sible vehicle for gaining the appropriate contact with the phenomenon can
justify failure to scrutinize the empirical record of successes and failures
of programs of community based learning. Sound epistemology cannot be
simply operationalized into sound pedagogy. Attention must also be paid
to the limitations of any effort to implement community based learning. In
connection with my own course, it became clear that a one-semester con
tact is not enough to gain a good grasp of things. Short term contact, even
supplemented by a few interviews with residents, is not enough. A longer
term interaction, with multiple phases and multiple dimensions, involving
participation in several courses or research projects clearly would be
conducive to nurturing greater interpretive abilities and also be more con
sistent with the fourth level of collaboration listed above. Gaining the
institutional conditions required for such longer term interaction remains
an ongoing problem.Meanwhile, the approach that I have presented
remains exploratory, and its conclusions provisional. Despite these
qualifications, it seems clear to me that if we can learn how to “listen to
the evidence,” and to incorporate what we “hear” in our efforts to under
stand the morally significant social phenomena of our times, we will in
deed be constructing a path that avoids the twin pitfalls of ideology and
illusion. That provides the ground for including community based learning
in the curriculum of the liberal arts college.
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